An introduction to the idea of “indoctrination”
 “Indoctrination” was developed by philosophers of education as an educational concept twice in the Twentieth Century, and its development continues. It stands as the opposite of education as injustice stands to justice. To understand education and its problems – particularly what is at stake – we need to grasp the nature and extent of indoctrination. . Here is an introduction. |
“Indoctrination” is a vital educational concept. It has to do with the harm that may be caused through learning
in the educational domain. Without a concept of this kind we cannot properly assess the state of education, or assess our many educational failures in terms of our own responsibility or the responsibility of others. By making this concept explicit, we are better able to see educational problems whole, and to identify the levels at which we might best act. If we are consciously aware of the potential harm which can be caused, we are less likely to cause it or go along with it.
As we learn to use the concept we also get a deeper appreciation of the moral significance of education. Without a concept of indoctrination, we might, when our educational efforts seem ineffective, be tempted to console ourselves that at least we don’t seem to be doing any great moral mischief. But as we examine instances of harmful learning, we are likely to become much less complacent; more aware of the extent of harm and of harmful practices, as well as the serious damage that is so widely being done to learners.
How serious can the harm be? Is serious harm likely to be widespread? Does it affect us? Are we responsible for causing any of it, or supporting processes that cause it? The answers to these very important questions require an understanding of the concept of indoctrination, and some experience and training (at least self-training) in its use.
Historical
The use of the word “indoctrination” as a form of educational harm is a Twentieth Century phenomenon. Prior to this, “to indoctrinate” simply meant “to teach”. Since teaching and schooling had largely been dominated by the church, the term “doctrine” referred to a bunch of ideas that were taught, and to indoctrinate was merely to teach them. More recently we have tended to become ambivalent about doctrines, often thinking of prevailing doctrines as intellectual obstacles. Doctrines differ according to the point of view of the group that is advancing them, and can readily be equated with the established views of those with the most power; views that are often difficult to challenge.
It is this more recent concept of indoctrination, having to do with harm, that we must concern ourselves with in education. This is important, because the development of this negative connotation has enabled education and indoctrination to be considered as opposites. The insights which result will be lost if the idea of “indoctrination” which is appropriate as an educational concept is confused with other meanings that involve no particular stand on harm or benefit.
One of these other meanings of “indoctrination” is very close to “orientation”, as this might occur with a new employee entering a new place of work. Here, “indoctrination” can be a form of showing them around – where things are located (the hook with the keys, the drawer with the forms), and what particular procedures we might have on this site for doing familiar things. The term is sometimes used this way in hospitals, for instance. This is not what “indoctrination” means when we are speaking educationally.
Past analyses of indoctrination in education
The more technical use of the term “indoctrination” first emerged in the United States in the 1930s. There was great concern at the time over the inculcation in schools of communist political doctrine in the Soviet Union, and Nazi doctrines in Germany. In this same context many writers were, of course, showing particular interest in the nature of a proper education for democracy. This inevitably raised the question of whether those who opposed Nazi and communist indoctrination might, themselves, be guilty of supporting similarly worrying forms of political “education” in their own systems (in the name of “democracy”). If students came out of civics courses all ardent supporters of democracy, did that mean that they had been indoctrinated? What would it take to ensure the intellectual freedom of the process?
In the 1960s, the concept of “indoctrination” again became of interest, this time principally to British and Australasian philosophers who sought to offer a “conceptual analysis” of the term. The primary inspiration for the effort this time had to do with religion, and it arose because of the persistence of Christian education in British State schools, and Catholic education also came in for close attention. Indoctrination in religion seemed so pervasive that it became possible to ask whether a religious education was even a coherent possibility. As these discussions persisted, political indoctrination continued to be of considerable interest as well.
These concerns were also bound up with worries about moral education, which was attracting considerable attention at the time as well. What was involved in coming to hold a morality freely, as opposed to being brought up simply to conform to moral rules? The issue becomes more acute to the extent that we are concerned that acting morally means that we must act for the right reasons, freely chosen.
This second effort involved a strong focus on producing a good analysis or “definition” of the concept of indoctrination itself. The effort was helpful in establishing some of the central interests that many wish to express in using the term “indoctrination”, but it also had a peculiar aspect. The peculiarity involved a desire to define indoctrination (or to express crucial judgement in the application of the concept) in terms of a single feature of its application.
Philosophers advanced a number of candidates for this single feature. Some supported the idea that it was the outcome of some processes – rigidity, and immunity to reasons or critical challenge, for instance. Others thought it to be some feature of the content being taught. They felt that the word “doctrine” must be significant, and attempted to understand doctrines in ways that would do the job. Yet others felt that it must be some sort of method, or cluster of methods employed in indoctrinatory teaching. The final candidate was the suggestion that indoctrination involved teaching with a certain kind of intention. Most participants in the debate wanted to define indoctrination exclusively in terms of one of these elements, considering the others important, but neither necessary nor sufficient. (SNOOK, CE)
What is peculiar here, is a tacit agreement that only one of these elements must appear as a defining criterion. It is interesting to compare this point with R.S. Peters’s analysis of the concept of “education”, that was widely admired at the time. To my knowledge, that analysis has never been criticised for combining a number of criteria. The single criterion which writers sought for indoctrination all proved to be inadequate, however, and the debate languished as a result.
My explanation for the trap into which the debate fell lies in the moral seriousness which consideration of indoctrination evokes. As writers contemplated the problem of indoctrination, they became more aware of the consequences of the harm that it caused; that is, the harm that could be done in the educational domain. They wanted to find ways of identifying this harm with great precision. They wanted to protect its potential victims. Because of this they were moved to attempt to tie the definition down more precisely than they would have attempted to do with the concept of education, because they felt the moral force of indoctrination more acutely. (SNOOK, IE)
Some years after this debate had fallen from the agenda of most philosophers, I had an experience that made this issue quite vivid. I attended a lecture by a non-philosophical colleague in a course in which I had a role. The lecturer claimed to our students that indoctrination was to teach doctrines with a non-critical method, doing so with the intention that the learners hold the views regardless of the evidence, and that this is the outcome that would have to occur. Since no teacher in New Zealand did all these things, he said, then no teacher in New Zealand was ever guilty of indoctrination. It was a perfect example of the precise thing that the philosophers wanted to avoid. The multiple criteria meant that the failure of any one (which was almost inevitable) would provide anyone with an escape clause.
It is only when we begin to take “harm” seriously that the danger of an “escape clause” begins to present itself, and it is why, in discussions of education without a concern for indoctrination, we can (and do) indulge ourselves in vague and noble abstractions with so very little at stake.
This is, indeed, a significant reason for becoming familiar with the concept of indoctrination ourselves. It functions as a tool that raises the moral “bar” for us in education and helps us to see the importance of getting clearer in our educational ideas, and of facing up to questions of real educational value.
It is all too easy to be intellectually casual and lazy about education. Educational practitioners, policy-makers and thinkers are far too willing to offer simplistic and self-serving justifications for what they do. They are far too superficial in their consideration of the interests of learners, and are cavalier about the serious dilemmas of justification, as if these perplexities can be set aside and ignored while we “get on with the practical job”.
The temptation to impose our own “wisdom” on others is not only considerable; without a fierce sense of the importance of self-determination defended by a strong concept of indoctrination, it is a temptation that we can surrender to with a complacent disregard. “Education” is often touted as a human right, but what is it, exactly, that we have a right to, and could that right be perverted, or be corrupted by manipulation? Could the idea of a “right” here be used by others to exploit the learner?
Without the concept of indoctrination, the idea that we are doing people some good in education has no coherent or vivid standard. For almost any bit of learning – even quite disastrous learning – a tale can always be told about how it can be turned to advantage. And so long as we reduce our learning interests into little bits, taking no account of the whole of a person and the whole of the mortal life they have to live, we can treat it all, in the abstract, as if we could all learn anything and everything eventually anyway.
Above all, we can be cavalier about what is involved in learning to make choices well, for what purposes and in whose interests, deciding for learners one minute because they are so ignorant, and in the next moment, when it suits us, letting them choose because they are the “consumers”, and innately wise. Our decisions aren’t pushed to basic assumptions, and this means that we do not feel that there is much at stake – except for things like unemployment, the economy, law and order, or being a burden on the tax-payer. Building people to satisfy these global, social agendas is quite easy to think about. Building a free person who can make something of their life and live it well is hardly thought of at all.
Spend time exploring indoctrination, and all that is likely to change. We are now looking at the ways in which encouraging people to learn things can harm them, and those around them, and where and how that might happen. The closer and wider we look, the more harm we discover, and the more serious it becomes, until we might begin to feel that we should co-opt that well-known principle from the medical field: in education, too, first do no harm. And this will push us to be clearer in our educational principles and concepts, and, if possible, more precise.
And so the philosophers in the indoctrination debate wanted to nail the term down to a single, and well-formulated criterion, because they wanted to stop some of the destructive things that were going on around them in the name of education, particularly in the area of religious “education”. In these first decades of the twenty-first century, most of us should understand why that should matter. We now have plenty of political agendas that would impose religious beliefs and behaviour on all of us.
None of the single criteria that were proposed for indoctrination were able to stand up to any rigorous testing; all falling, in the end, to profound objections. The most popular candidate was “method”. Indoctrination, it was often felt, must be some sort of method of teaching; usually a method that did not involve reasons, or perverted them, or was applied in ways designed to circumvent or disregard the willingness or awareness of learners. Many continue to reach for this interpretation when the word occurs to them.
Method foundered as a criterion, however, because every such method could be discovered to have a place in some legitimate educational practice or other, and hence failed the overriding test that indoctrination is harmful. We often have to learn important things in circumstances where we are unaware of them, or without reasons. This is at the heart of the primary educational problematic, and addressing it satisfactorily is a central part of adequate educational justification. An extended discussion of these issues and their possible resolution can be found in Part 4 of Education – as if our lives depended on it.
It is important to note this clearly at this point, because it is a commonplace error when people reach for the word. It is often even expressed by people who want to say that, surely, some indoctrination is good. It is not merely that this would be a logical contradiction. As educational terminology has been developed, to suggest that indoctrination must sometimes be good, the speaker robs themselves, and those who feel inclined to agree with them, of suitable language to describe the harm that is done in the educational domain.
What term are they now going to use to describe the harm? It is the equivalent of suggesting that, surely, some injustice is surely a good thing. The consequences of such errors are far-reaching, doing much to diminish the sense of the damage that can be done through our control of learning. Indoctrination isn’t just “mis-education”, or “education-gone-wrong”. If we abandon the idea of indoctrination-as-harm, what language are we now going to use to give an account of activity that is in opposition to, or corrupting of, the value of education? Where there has been a lack of a clear discourse about this, educational thought and decision has been at its most primitive, and most lacking in ethical standards.
Such strategies, too, have become rather outdated, for it is now clearly inadequate to attempt to restrict terms like education or indoctrination to the language of schooling and teaching, which describing indoctrination as a “method” clearly implies. Since the 1960s, we have all become much more aware that certain social phenomena, such as racism and discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, sexism and gender, ageism and social class are unquestionably matters of indoctrination, and that the processes involved in creating them extend far beyond schooling and teaching, or anything that could be reduced to a “method”. While they can be found in schools and their practices, their cultivation and maintenance by a variety of processes of socialisation are widespread in our culture and its institutions. “Indoctrination” in our negative sense applies comfortably to them all, and this completely defeats the inclination to reduce it to a “method”.
More than that, as a result of extensive work done by educational researchers, it is clear, not only that these forms of indoctrination exist in schools as a part of a “hidden curriculum”, but also that, simply in terms of the way in which it is institutionalised, universal, compulsory State schooling is indoctrinatory in itself. It does more harm than good to those who pass through it.
Again, this cannot be reduced to “method”, but is inherent in the authority structure, the ways in which decisions are made, the mass, factory nature of the management of learners, and the severe limitations on the role of learners in decisions about what they learn, and how they are assessed. Schools systematically work counter to the sorts of processes that would equip learners to make the best of their lives.
The debate of the nineteen-sixties did suggest several things which we could more usefully use as defining attributes of indoctrination, though they were not noticed at the time. All of the writers, for example, agreed that it was about harmful learning, as has already been discussed, and their agreement here should have been a clue. In addition, though “intention” failed as the defining characteristic, its plausibility is, I think, connected to the fact that all seemed to consider indoctrination as a matter for moral responsibility. They wanted to nail the analysis down precisely, because they wanted to hold people responsible for it where it occurs.
Moral responsibility is, of course, broader than intention, since it includes things we should have made ourselves aware of, as well as those things that we are, in fact, aware of. This should animate us to deepen our awareness and understanding of what is at stake, educationally, lest we engage in unwitting harm. The ethics of responsibility for education, and indoctrination, should be the motive for educational inquiry.
These two points were so taken for granted that they were not even discussed for the power that they might have offered to definition, yet they may well suffice. If the language of “necessary and sufficient conditions” has any value here, we could say that harm and responsibility are jointly necessary and sufficient. More specifically:
that indoctrination must involve learning which will harm the learner in some way
and that
indoctrination must involve conditions of learning and experience for which individuals or groups of people can be held morally responsible.
The second of these does most to draw the boundary between the educational domain and other kinds of learning, and it can be broken down further. Responsibility consists of those kinds of learning or experience which some person or group should reasonably be expected to
foresee, and which they should reasonably be expected to control. We understand this readily enough when we consider experiences that young children should be protected from, out of concern for the damage to their learning that may ensue. With careful thought and study, dependent on a sound understanding of human development, we can readily build from such insights.
In a very large number of instances which we might have wished to describe as indoctrination, particularly because of the extent of the harm, we will have to assign a “weak” sense of indoctrination. This will be because we can recognize that while some people, with educational knowledge and insight, can be expected to avoid the harmful learning with foresight and control, nevertheless other particular people cannot. They know too little, or they are themselves such victims of indoctrination as to render an attribution of responsibility inappropriate. Where educational awareness is as low as it is today, we should expect to have to make a lot of use of this weaker sense, and to see indoctrination, in this weaker sense, as a very serious social problem.
These are the sorts of cases that we would want to reduce by helping people to be more aware of the educational implications of their actions and commitments. Responsibility does most to explain why education should not be equated with all socialisation, or all enculturation, because these socialisations or enculturations will no doubt include much learning for which people cannot be held responsible. Just growing up among other people may inevitably lead to certain experiences regardless of what we might do.
Some kinds of enculturation and socialisation will be invisible to learners much of the time – as it will also be to their caregivers, who take their cultural world for granted, and are complacent about it. Some of it may always be invisible, being in the nature of enculturation itself. Hence enculturation and socialisation are larger, where learning is concerned, than is education, since the whole world of learning will include the aware, the could-be-aware, and the invisible. There will, moreover, be learning that is simply accidental, and this too will fall outside the educational domain.
We need to be careful here, of course. It will be very easy to say “I could not help that; that is just a part of the culture”. It could be a convenient excuse, when the culture itself is made by human beings, and could be changed by them. Our awareness of the culture, and our complacency about it will be very significant. And it is revealing, of course, that this too, is an educational problem.
Thus, parents may despair of protecting their children from being absorbed into a consumerist culture that distorts their ability to think well about good living, and make good decisions, feeling quite unable to moderate its influence on every hand. Nevertheless, the culture stands in place because it is promoted by many people, and simply accepted by many more who submit to it and give it little thought. It stays in place because its members reproduce it. All people who participate in the culture are, in a sense, responsible for it. Cultures aren’t just inevitably consumerist, and hence consumerism is not immutable.
Though it can be said that many of these people – perhaps most – have not been equipped to explore their own culture, or to recognize the contribution they make to its maintenance, it may be unfair to hold them responsible in a strong sense. But in considering this, we are beginning to unravel circles or loops of indoctrination, and that is a significant part of the educational undertaking. The urgency of the responsibility will be greatest for those who see it first. All of the people in the indoctrination debate of the nineteen-sixties were keen to be able to identify and sheet home responsibility, irrespective of their differences over the “single criterion”.
The harm
Harmfulness is a necessary property of the concept of indoctrination which is of concern in education, as we have seen. In the “harm” there is the clue as to how we can distinguishes education within the larger domain of learning, including socialisation and enculturation, and also to distinguish education and indoctrination more precisely. This is the question of value. In education, we are only interested in learning that has value in some way. If the learning is of no consequence whatsoever, we will not be interested in it as educational at all. It won’t be in the “educational domain”.
If it is of value in the sense of being beneficial or worthwhile, we will call it “education”. If it is harmful or destructive in some way, we will pick it out as such, because of the kinds of learning that we already see as valuable. Harmful learning will be that which defeats beneficial learning by corrupting it or displacing it.
This would include “busy-work”, or activities such as learning material that will be forgotten soon after the assessment when we could have been pursuing questions and inquiries as they arise, and that alter our outlook or our ways of doing things that are alive for us. There are always time constraints on learning, and if comparatively trivial matters drive away opportunities to consider those that are more serious, then the abuse of valuable learning-time can be destructive.
All of these things that are harmful or destructive of valuable learning, we will call “indoctrination”, because of the price our learners will be paying with their lives. We could deliberately indoctrinate, simply by filling the learning-time of students with relatively trivial content so that they had no chance to learn what matters. In this way we could render them dependent upon our agendas that we offer in advertising and PR campaigns, and through discussions in the media that we can control by exploiting our status.
This account of education, and the distinction between education and indoctrination, seems to be made at a more general level than the criteria which were sought in the indoctrination debate; whether it was the intention, content or method and so on. Greater clarity lies, not in those sorts of analyses, but in getting clear about educational purposes or values. We begin to be able to identify indoctrination once we begin to decide what learning matters, and why it is valuable, exploring these values in some detail. This enables us to describe what learning will be harmful, for it will be harmful to our ability to achieve learning that is valuable. Racist or sexist indoctrination, for instance, attacks the ability of people to perceive and realize their equal worth as human beings, and undermines the better conditions of their association. The more we pursue this understanding of indoctrination through studying cases, the more accurate and confident we will become in our educational judgment.
This may make understanding education appear a daunting task, because values are often held to be the things we seem least confident about, when it comes to proposing judgments for us to hold collectively. People will say that values are just matters of opinion, that they are personal, and that we shouldn’t go around imposing our values on each other.
But whenever we venture to direct the learning of people, we are making decisions about what should be of value to them, and what judgements they should learn to make – whether we “like” making value judgements or not. It is important – and handy – to remember here that this applies, even when we are making educational decisions about ourselves, which thrusts us up against that insight that “we don’t know what we don’t know”. When we are making educational decisions, even about ourselves, we are making decisions about who we will become, and we are doing it from a standpoint from which our foresight into the future is radically imperfect, full as it is with “what we don’t know”. All educators are in this position, whether they are self-educators or the educators of others.
On the one hand, therefore, we are making value judgments when we engage in any educational activity, and we cannot avoid educational decisions because of what is at stake in these decisions – how significant our decisions about learning can turn out to be. This apparent paradox does give us a clue to the way in which such decisions can be made with the least harmful imposition, however. We can make them always with a view to our power and ability to the making of future decisions, and from as large a perspective on ourselves as possible – as whole human beings across the expansive possibilities of the length and breadth of our whole lives. This is not an inevitable recipe for vagueness. It prioritizes our good processes of exploration and inquiry. It prioritizes our abilities to reason, to take intellectual responsibility for ourselves, to capitalise on intellectual and emotional challenge, on our flexibility and resilience, and on our understanding of our own humanity.
This solution captures the priority of reason that was so characteristic of the indoctrination debate, but what it does, I think, is correct its emphasis. Reason is important, not just in itself, as something somehow focused upon a pursuit of truth that has intrinsic value which is independent of ourselves. It is important because of our humanity. Reason is important so that we can live good lives, and the first point of intrinsic value lies in our human worth. We are all equally worthwhile as human beings, just in ourselves. Indoctrination is an ethical concept, and only in the service of that is it epistemological. Reasons count because prospering or flourishing as human beings counts.
My own approach to choosing the values which would enable us to distinguish between education and indoctrination in an effective and powerful way has been to focus upon the core ethical principle of respect-for-persons; that “all persons ought to be respected equally”, spelling out the reciprocal relationship between self-respect and respect for each other in their principles, their impulses and their practices. My plan has been to develop these in enough detail so that we can make progress in educational decision-making, using the spelling out of these values to bring greater precision to concepts, the analysis of cases, and to educational judgment itself. If my approach will not do, then another will need to be found. The least of my hopes is to provide a model of such articulation that would have to be bettered, since I do not think that, at present, any equivalent exists.
The purpose of education, I suggest, should be to foster and promote the abilities of learners to choose and develop their own conception of a worthwhile life for themselves, and to assist them in the implementation of that conception. This development of our own good lives is, I have claimed, a duty of self-respect that flows from the principle of respect for persons, and that it must be carried through under the constraint of respect for other people, while also enabling the sociability upon which the development of any life-plan depends.
The importance of this mutuality, predicated as it is upon the equality of respect, also hinges upon a proper recognition of the many ways in which our abilities even to think about our own good are contingent upon the possibilities of social relationships and a social order. Respecting others is profoundly in our self-interest, and it is in a proper exploration of that self-interest that our appreciation of the importance of our respect for them is to be discovered.
This analysis of educational purpose has the advantages of tapping into the ethical value of the equal intrinsic worth of each human being which is at our cultural core, underlying our agreements over human rights. At the same time, it enables us to discriminate between beneficial and harmful learning, and the social practices that can enable either, equipping us to analyse educational responsibility in some detail, and carry educational judgment into all of our institutional arrangements.
Most of us have been aware of many of these harms for quite a long time, though we haven’t been able to name them very clearly in educational terms. We appear to live in democracies, for example, yet the content of our diverse learning environments does much to encourage us to be ignorant of the sorts of understandings which good democratic judgement in the individual would require. We are also encouraged, in numerous ways, to feel politically impotent and cynical, and to define our lives outside any form of political participation.
The excuse for not offering a critical understanding of politics and political philosophy in schools, for instance, is that any form of public education would be biased, or that it would conflict with a parental right to impose their own political views on the young. But party politics is not at all the same thing as a serious and critical examination of the good society or its core institutions, or of the failure of many of our social practices to live up to our professed values and the rights embedded in our constitutional arrangements. Nor is imparting some sort of “political truth” to the young the only strategy available to us. We could bend our efforts to enabling them to decide well for themselves.
If it was ever possible to set up such constitutional arrangements based upon some agreed system of rights, let alone compulsory schooling systems at all, these arguments against the educational critique of our society are fatally weak, particularly in democracies that claim their legitimacy in popular sovereignty. Needless to say, the net result is to maintain power in the hands of some at the expense of others, and to simplify the problems of government (which have largely become problems of “good management” with insufficient public accountability).
I have found that many students are hard-pressed to come up with their own example of indoctrination to begin with, but once they have made a serious start, they soon begin to see it everywhere – as it is – and to recognise the enormity of the scale and destructiveness of indoctrination in modern societies. They also begin to discover the harmful effects in their own lives. The experience of their educational awakening was so vivid that, for many years, I thought that our educational world would be utterly transformed for the better, simply by minimizing the amount of indoctrination that there is around us, since these currently constitute so many obstacles to our learning valuable things, to engaging in worthwhile undertakings, and to taking charge of our own lives.
Over time I came to appreciate that dealing with indoctrination more comprehensively requires, in turn, more attention to analysing the benefit that is “education”; positively speaking. This should have been quite obvious, and highlights my claim that our educational understanding is impoverished through our failure to employ an effective opposite to “education”. The two arms of study are inseparable, and need to be continuously maintained in a dialectical relationship.
“Indoctrination” is one of the most important concepts we could develop and use. Not only is it one of the most significant keys to understanding why people seem to fall so readily into misfortune, and one of our most important clues toward bringing people up to be strong, capable and confident, and sustaining them well, it is also a principal tool for self-understanding where the care and repair of our own learning is concerned. It isn’t merely a useful concept for prospective and practicing teachers; its significance extends to the quality of all our lives, but is even more urgent when we are instrumental in bringing up others, or contributing to social change, or engaging in any form of “management”. It is, I believe, a vital “missing link” where human understanding is concerned.
I recall proposals that our understanding of justice would be facilitated by the development of “injustice studies”. I think the same would be true of education. “Indoctrination Studies” would enable us to trace the course of our value judgments more accurately. It would enrich our understanding of possible instances, spheres and mechanisms of indoctrination. And it would hone our judgment. It would supply tools and skills for improving organisations. In addition, the study of indoctrination would help us to be more demanding and accurate in our efforts to clarify proper educational practice, to purge our discourse of the vagueness and ambiguity with which it is so often plagued, and that is the source of so much dissatisfaction with the little that we currently achieve.
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Snook, I.A. Indoctrination and Education (1972a) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
Snook, I.A. (ed) Concepts of Indoctrination (1972b) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Education – as if our lives depended on it.
© R. Graham Oliver 2004, 2018 (updated)
